In a prior post I explored a possible connection between polarization and theories of civilizational collapse. In this post I want to continue to explore the implications of the notion of Joseph Tainter and like minded collapse scholars, such as Thomas Homer Dixon, that energy is the key factor in bringing about civilizational collapse. Simply put, these theorists suggest that "progress" is an artifact (that is to say a direct effect) of the increasing complexity of societies made possible by increasing access to the main fuel sources of those societies. But when societies reach levels of complexity that represent the peak of the energy budgets allowed for by their fuel sources, but their complexity throws up problems requiring higher energy levels, collapse back to a level of complexity that can be sustained will occur. Think of the environmental issues that global industrial societies unleash, or issues about wealth distribution, such as support of social programs, taxation and ballooning public debt. If societies had unlimited energy, such crises could be easily dealt with. We could simply add new complexity as needed: Desalinate water, scrub air of CO2, provide guaranteed incomes or shorter work weeks for everyone, and create vast new bureaucratic mechanisms to collect the taxes needed and deal with any side affects of that taxation.
The average relative poverty rate (i.e. the share of people living with less than half the median disposable income in their country) in OECD countries was 11.4% in 2021. Poverty rates were highest in the United States at 18%, or almost one fifth of the population. More than one‑third of people in OECD states were described in a 2024 report as being at risk of falling into poverty. (OECD [2024], Society at a Glance 2024: OECD Social Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/918d8db3-en.). Since the early 1800s, most working people could expect that there was a good chance that their children would have a better life. Despite the immense heights of general affluence that our society has achieved, it is the confidence of that expectation that has increasingly come into doubt as average wage growth has stagnated, job security decreased and infrastructures continue to teeter.
Of course those of us of leftist inclinations will insist that we have the technology, wealth and natural resources to at least solve the social issues. Just tax the hyper rich and everyone can be provided a modest modern lifestyle. But such hopes, even if realizable, still run into the hard issues of our environmental challenges. It is not clear that achieving the communitarian ideals dreamt of throughout the 20th century, that societies would have the energy to also grapple with the environmental challenges of modern life. Certainly unleashing even greater levels of personal consumption by the 99% is not the most obvious way to lessen the impacts of human beings on the natural world. Despite great advances in renewables, the transition from carbon sources will still be difficult. In the mean time manufactured doubt allows fossil fuel providers and their supporters to seek to squeeze a few more years of profit out of that industry. Meanwhile industrial societies continue to grapple with fraying public services and safety nets, largely stagnant real wage growth, high employment precarity, vastly increasing public debt, a housing crisis, declining trust in institutions and increasing reactionary political movements.
It is common wisdom that unhappiness is stalking most societies. Substance abuse and mental health "epidemics" (loneliness, anxiety, stress, misinformation via the decline of professional journalism) are increasing. Fears about managing demographic shifts and population decline are increasing. Again, easy access to new levels of wealth via sources of energy at least equivalent in energy density to current sources, or EROEI, "energy return on energy invested" as engineers call it, could do wonders to help solve such problems. This is what happened over the last 2 centuries of the fossil expansion. The increasing availability of energy dense fossil sources fueled the creation of the industrial revolution and public institutions and eventually social programs to the benefit of ordinary people. But it goes without saying that increasing taxation or public public debt are no longer viable political strategies. Instead we seem increasingly trapped in a "debt doom loop"
It is common wisdom that it would be political suicide for democratic governments to advocate for austerity and increased taxation, so launching new "great society" projects like those of the last century is increasingly inconceivable. Today, the height of dreaming seems limited to hoping for modest tax reductions that are somehow still compatible with fixing the growing potholes on nearby streets. And let's just hope that we don't have to grapple with another global pandemic again any time soon...
In such an unhappy time it is common to observe that a major aspect of populist movements is a tendency to manifest forms of scapegoating. In deindustrialized Britain it is Brussels bureaucrats and foreign workers (the proverbial polish plumber") who are singled out for blame. In America it is Mexicans and the Chinese but also increasingly simply all other countries, including Canada who are the focus of ire. In Russia it is "the decadent West", similarly in many Muslim societies. In Israel-- Arabs. In Europe it is Muslims and migrants. But it might also be the Chinese, if it weren't for the Americans abandoning their traditional role as "leader of the Free World" forcing them into the arms of China. In China it is the specter of the "century of humiliation" at the hands of Western colonizers. In the minds of many progressives and leftists, it is the "corporations", "hyper rich", "1%" or reactionary conservatives who are to blame. For conservatives, it is "woke" social activists and their inscrutable social reform agendas or "the establishment" and "elites" and their lackeys in "traditional media." For the Belville shooter it was "the Jews." On Oct. 19, Albertans will vote in a referendum that is meant to determine the path forward for a province that included "five questions on the issue of immigration. These include a proposal for Alberta to take increased control over its borders 'for the purposes of decreasing immigration,' plus a series of questions about whether the non-permanent residents should be stripped of access to publicly funded services like health care and education, or required to pay a fee" (Richie Assaly, "Alberta’s shameless attempt to scapegoat immigrants" Globe & Mail, Sept 19, 2026). The demons populating the land multiply. As David Brook's observes, "inner pain turns to outer hostility."
But what few seem to ask is what the source of this growing global pain and anxiety is unleashing these "dark passions" as Brooks describes them leading to a seeming "fear of almost everything"? Rather than referring to an inscrutable so-called "poly crisis" collapse theorists point to the fundamental problem of societal overshoot of energy budgets as the underlying cause. Fossil energy is the common factor for the progress of all societies for the past 2 centuries. But the process of the running down these sources is so abstract and detached from more tangible social effects that it is extremely difficult discern. As suggested by historians like Ronald Wright, societies undergoing collapse have rarely been aware of subtle shifts in energy flows as the fundamental cause of their decline. Rather it has been "barbarians" or internal "decadence" or minorities tangentially attached to the crises unleashed by shifts in energy flows who are made to shoulder the blame.
For any specific crisis politicians or technical specialists can be blamed, either for their personal corruption or ignorance. As Homer-Dixon and Wright make clear there are very few examples of societies managing to selectively and carefully "walk back" aspects of their complexity to buy themselves surplus energy to formulate new less complex systems or to reach boldly for new energy sources of equal or better EROEI. If new sources only match existing sources in their EROEI, fall short, or are used primarily to satisfy increases in demand of existing forms of complexity, as seems the case, the crises can only continue to get worse, and most of our current proposed alternatives seem only to match current fossil sources. Turchin's historical work is also relevant here. Societies that progress tend towards "elite overproduction," which can only hasten processes of collapse.
Out of such reflections come some simple deductions. If scapegoating occurs when societies feel stressed but are unable to resolve the real causes of problems leading them to seek irrationally for others to blame, then one must ask: What problem today are people globally failing to grasp? Fossil energy, relatively cheap until recent decades, clearly gave us the power for the last 200 years to build our increasingly affluent global society, but when that energy source begins to dwindle or become problematic then the "engine of progress" begins to falter. People's confidence in a future for themselves and their offspring begins to waver. If we are unaware of theories like Tainter's then we might be tempted to scapegoat. But if we apply the thinking of collapse theorists, then we must prioritize seeking new higher EROEI energy sources or reducing our dependency on forms of complexity by selectively abandoning less vital aspects of it. Or do both.
These two goals must become the focus of political life. For example, we must discuss walking back energy wasted on car-dependent forms of urban development or fossil intensive forms of agriculture. Approaches like this can allow us to seek efficiencies providing new reserves of energy to help orchestrate a "soft landing." In the worst case scenario, where major new forms of high EROEI energy do not manifest themselves, then we can still hope to orchestrate a soft landing. So careful sifting of existing forms of complexity, which is just another way of saying "technologies and technological systems," such as those behind auto dependency, is just as important, if not more so, than prioritizing energy innovation. We must resist the vague resignation of conservative thinkers, like Britain's John Gray, who suggest that "adaptation" is the only realistic option, and those who argue that people are just somehow becoming "more bad," or that the perception of growing scapegoating is somehow simply a misperception.
I have no doubt that there are some specific contemporary cultural phenomena that might contribute to the rise of scapegoating in some instances. The characteristics of the new media could be making the phenomenon worse. For example, unlike traditional broadcasting media, modern "narrow casting" media, as a simple structural aspect of their operation, profoundly undermine possibilities for editorial quality control and moderated democratic debate and increase the incentives and possibilities for the distribution of false information. Such a cause could in certain instances increase the misunderstanding of problems we are facing. But this mechanism, by itself, cannot straightforwardly explain the growing sense of impending doom or the sense that problems generally are spiraling out of control. Indeed, increasing misunderstanding could just as well be expected to dissipate awareness of problems or appreciation of their intensity, leaving popular perceptions about problems in general effectively a wash.
For example, currently many people categorize AI as one of the most significant problem facing humanity. But others claim that AI is on the cusp of providing solutions to all our problems, including environmental ones. Google tells me "AI-linked companies account for roughly 40% to 45% of the S&P 500's total market capitalization." And up to over 50% to 62% depending on broader definitions including things like utilities and infrastructure. In the midst of an expanding climate crisis based on a need to decarbonize energy systems this fact should be shocking. The fact that governments around the world are not working with singular focus on tempering this allocation of the precious wealth should be a scandal. But instead, we are easily find ourselves discussing the "existential threat" of AI. Few, it would seem recognize declining energy as our main existential threat. But perhaps in the growing resistance to data centres there is some such awareness? But it is unclear whether that resistance is about the need to decarbonize, or primarily about skyrocketing electricity rates, concerns about unemployment and killer robots.
Which leads me to conclude that we would benefit from considering the arguments of civilizational collapse theorists. Their insights could enlighten social phenomena like scapegoating and help lead us back to a more properly focused civilizational discourse about the issues we are facing today.
